Observation · testing · independent evidence
Electoral audit
Electoral audit verifies the process of Candeia elections; it does not audit public elections in real-world countries. It must test the implementation actually used, permit observation compatible with security and produce independent evidence before certification.
Current statusNo audit of an actual election is under way.Proposed constitutional basis
In brief
Audit connects technology and legitimacy. Its analysis requires technical depth; its conclusion serves as evidence for the electoral authority and Candeia Justice without replacing the decision of the competent authority.
How the Constitution structures this subject
Sufficient access to evidence
Candeian and external observers may follow procedures where compatible with security, secrecy and legal status.
Before the election
Independent tests must cover functional correctness, security, capacity, recovery, configuration and chain of custody.
The provider does not audit itself alone
Validation may not depend exclusively on the provider’s own tool, evidence and interpretation.
Public oversight without exposing vulnerabilities
Methodology, relevant failures, corrections and conclusions are published; temporary confidentiality protects only a concrete risk.
How it works
Identify code, configuration and critical parameters.
Run public and independent tests proportionate to risk.
Preserve chain of custody and access to evidence.
Examine integrity and counting before final certification.
Limits and safeguards
- An auditor produces evidence and an opinion; the auditor does not legally certify the winner.
- Business secrecy may not block an authorised auditor’s access to indispensable material.
- A material anomaly must be investigated even when the apparent margin of the result is large.