Target, selector, scope, method and duration must be delimited.
Privacy, private life and communications
This page defines constitutional limits for any internal access, investigation or security function that may come to exist in Candeia; it does not announce a current external-surveillance capability. Privacy does not depend on calling an environment a “home”: an account, device, private repository, communications and sensitive metadata receive protection because of what they reveal about a person’s life.
Proposed Constitution · reference text · not promulgatedA digital environment does not lose protection merely because it is hosted by a provider or technically accessible to the State.
Compulsory access to private content requires a legal basis and proportionate controls. Art. 55 requires a prior, specific and reasoned judicial order for search, seizure, mirroring or forensic extraction, except in narrowly defined emergencies. Art. 56 also protects metadata capable of revealing sensitive patterns and prohibits untargeted bulk acquisition for later law-enforcement or intelligence exploitation.
Privacy is contextual, not merely territorial
A legitimate expectation of privacy may exist in physical or digital spaces. A classification made by contract, platform or provider cannot erase the constitutional safeguard. The central issue is the relationship between the person, content, function and context.
The technical ability to collect or query data does not authorise its processing.
Incidental data and third-party data require restricted handling.
Legitimate secrecy does not eliminate logging, supervision or remedies.
Defensive telemetry is not a licence to surveil
Technical data used to contain incidents may exist without an investigative purpose, but it must be minimised and compartmentalised. If the activity begins to identify, profile or correlate people, or to inspect content, the full safeguards governing privacy, policing and intelligence apply.
How this right appears in practice
A search of your digital environment needs defined scope and legal basis; it cannot be a blanket authorisation to “see everything”.
Metadata may receive protection as serious as content when it reveals relationships, routines or sensitive patterns.
The State cannot circumvent safeguards simply by purchasing data that it could not lawfully obtain directly without an adequate legal basis.
Implication for people using Candeia
When using Sistema Candeia, the expectation is that each module processes only the data necessary for its function, separates access according to competence and logs relevant queries. The public GOV interface must not expose private content or assume that technical access amounts to legal authorisation.
What this safeguard does not mean
Privacy does not prevent technical security, lawful investigation or compliance with a valid judicial order.
Data already held by the State or a third party does not become free from purpose limitation and proportionality.
Temporary secrecy may exist in legally defined cases, but it does not eliminate subsequent oversight.
Privacy must follow every module
When using Sistema Candeia, the expectation is that each module processes only the data necessary for its function, separates access according to competence and logs relevant queries. The public GOV interface must not expose private content or assume that technical access amounts to legal authorisation.