future internal monetary stability
Central Bank of Candeia
In Candeia’s economic architecture, the Central Bank is the internal institution provided to administer the Candeian Escudo and payment stability if the monetary system is activated. Today, this institution is not installed.
Pre-Foundation · permanent institution not installedConstitutional Proposal · reference text · not promulgated
Why it exists
If the Candeian Escudo enters operation, issuance, liquidity, reserves and payment stability cannot depend on improvised decisions by the Government or a private operator. The Central Bank is the proposed structure for that internal function.
How the monetary institution is constrained
Safeguard Candeia’s currency with political independence: preserve its value reference, monitor the quantity of money and system liquidity, and contribute to stable payment and settlement operations.
Monetary policy and issuance of the monetary base within the Constitution. Systemic liquidity, reserves, payment infrastructure and general macroprudential instruments. Cooperation with the PFRA, Fiscal Council and Treasury without merging competences.
A seven-member board: 3 elected by the Assembly by a three-fifths majority; 2 appointed by the President from public lists of the Appointments Commission; 1 chosen by the Court of Audit and 1 by the Independent Fiscal Council. The Governor is elected internally from among the members.
No single power or institutional coalition may appoint a majority. The Governor serves for four years without extending the individual term as a board member.
Board members: single, staggered seven-year terms.
Sufficient financial and operational autonomy to act without discretionary authorisation from the Government, Treasury, a creditor, supervised entity or provider; legitimate monetary-policy disagreement is not grounds for removal.
Its own published and protected institutional budget; constitutional execution does not depend on discretionary annual authorisation from the general budget, without excluding audit and accountability.
Grounds and procedures defined constitutionally/by reinforced organic law may not permit removal for legitimate monetary-policy disagreement; lawful accounting losses are not, by themselves, grounds for removal.
Independent internal audit, annual external audit, submission of financial statements to the Assembly and Court of Audit, judicial review of legality and public accountability.
Minutes, balance sheets, financial statements, institutional budget, criteria, audits, decisions and monetary publications to the extent compatible with stability and legitimate secrecy.
It does not finance ordinary deficits, use reserves as the Government’s unrestricted cash, license or resolve private institutions in place of the PFRA, or promise non-existent external convertibility.
What it would do once installed
- Monetary policy and issuance of the monetary base within the Constitution.
- Systemic liquidity, reserves, payment infrastructure and general macroprudential instruments.
- Cooperation with the PFRA, Fiscal Council and Treasury without merging competences.
An internal central bank is not a commercial bank
It does not finance ordinary deficits, use reserves as the Government’s unrestricted cash, replace the PFRA in supervising private institutions or promise non-existent external convertibility.
Related pages
Monetary policy and finance
This profile describes governance and institutional independence. To understand the Candeian Escudo, issuance, the SDR anchor and reserves, see the monetary section.