oversight of exceptional internal mechanisms
Independent Inspectorate-General for Intelligence and Surveillance
If Candeia ever operates exceptional investigation, security or restricted-data-access mechanisms within its own ecosystem, they cannot function without independent oversight. The Inspectorate is the proposed institution for supervising those internal powers without directing operations.
Pre-Foundation · permanent institution not installedConstitutional Proposal · reference text · not promulgated
Why it exists
Exceptional access to Candeian systems and data, if ever necessary, must leave a record, have a valid basis and be reviewable by an institution independent from the area carrying out the measure.
How it oversees exceptional access
Oversee, within systems and data under Candeia’s responsibility, any exceptional investigation, security and restricted-access mechanisms, with sufficient access to reconstruct legality, retention, queries, tool use and controls, without directing operations.
Audit classified internal operations, selectors, authorisations, queries, sharing, retention and destruction. Inspect systems, contracts, tools and audit records and receive reports/complaints. Precautionarily suspend for up to 72 hours an act that is manifestly without legal basis and poses serious risk, while seeking immediate judicial confirmation.
A five-member collegiate body qualified by the Appointments Commission: 1 elected by the Assembly by a three-fifths majority; 1 chosen by the Constitutional Court by a six-ninths majority; 1 by the Ombudsman; 1 by the Data Protection and Digital Rights Authority; and 1 selected by public lot.
No source controls a majority; requirements combine constitutional law, fundamental rights, intelligence, investigation, data, audit and cybersecurity.
Single, staggered seven-year terms.
A five-year incompatibility applies to leadership of a supervised body, party campaigning in Candeia and a principal provider of exceptional-access tools; material relationships must be declared and give rise to recusal.
The minimum operational capacity required to supervise active exceptional mechanisms within Candeia forms part of the CCME; the safeguards of Arts. 254 to 268 apply.
For the grounds set out in Art. 266, by decision of 6 of the 9 members of the Constitutional Court after duly authorised charges.
The Inspectorate’s own access is individually attributable and auditable; interim measures require judicial confirmation; aggregated reports and Assembly oversight coexist without subordination.
Aggregated oversight reports, access records, audits, findings, recommendations and special reports on systemic abuse to the extent compatible with legitimate secrecy.
It oversees; it does not choose targets, authorise individual operations, direct intelligence policy or replace a judge in the original authorisation.
What it audits in practice
- Audit classified internal operations, selectors, authorisations, queries, sharing, retention and destruction.
- Inspect systems, contracts, tools and audit records and receive reports/complaints.
- Precautionarily suspend for up to 72 hours an act that is manifestly without legal basis and poses serious risk, while seeking immediate judicial confirmation.
Oversight is not target selection
The Inspectorate does not choose targets, authorise individual operations, direct intelligence policy or replace a judge in the original authorisation. Its remit covers mechanisms and data under Candeia’s responsibility.